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ARTICLES
Can Research Subjects of Clinical Trials in
Developing Countries Sue Physician-Investigators for
Human Rights Violations?
Jonathan Todres*
INTRODUCTION
On February 17, 1998, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) unexpectedly announced that it was calling off the
maternal-child HIV transmission clinical trials in developing
countries, stating that it was satisfied with the results from the drug
trial in Thailand.' This announcement brought to an abrupt end a drug
trial that had been surrounded by controversy since its inception.
The CDC, National Institutes of Health and others had
developed the clinical trials in an attempt to address the problem of
increasing numbers of children born HIV-positive in developing
countries, with little chance for survival. Maternal-child HIV
transmission rates in the developing countries ranged between 25%
and 42%.2 With an estimated 2.3 million HIV-infected women
. Mr. Todres is a U.S. lawyer currently working in London, England. He
holds a B.A. from Clark University and a J.D. from Columbia Law School. The author
worked for a number of years in international health, including three years in Thailand.
The author would like to thank Harold Edgar and Louis Henkin, Professors, Columbia
Law School, for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The views
expressed in the article are solely those of the author. The author welcomes comments on
this article at <jtodres@workmail.com>.
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Placebo Use Is Suspended in Overseas AIDS
Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1998, at A16. There had been sixteen clinical trials ongoing
at sites in Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast, Kenya,
Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Nine of the studies
were funded by the CDC or the National Institutes for Health (NIH), both U.S.
Government agencies. In total, fifteen of the trials involved the use of placebos. See
Ronald Bayer, The Debate Over Maternal-Fetal HIV Transmission Prevention Trials in
Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean: Racist Exploitation or Exploitation of Racism?, 88 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 567 (1998). The results from Thailand were the first and led to the
cancellation of the other trials in the study.
2 See Usa Thisyakorn, et al., International Symposium on Biomedical
Research Issues of HIV Infection in Thailand: Perinatal Transmission of HIV and
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worldwide giving birth each year,3 many countries were facing the
prospect of a public health crisis.
Attempting to respond to this problem, the clinical trials aimed
to test the efficacy of a "short-course" of AZT (also called
zidovudine) in preventing perinatal transmission of HIV. .The short-
course AZT regimen consists of oral AZT in the last four weeks of
pregnancy and during labor for the mother, in contrast to the currently
recommended treatment - the ACTG-076 regimen4 - which calls
for giving HIV-positive pregnant women AZT for twenty-six weeks
during pregnancy and intravenously during childbirth and giving AZT
to the newborn infant for the first six weeks of life. The primary
justification for the "short-course" was the need to find an affordable
treatment option for developing countries.5 The debate over the AZT
clinical trials centered around the fact that some research subjects
infected with the HIV virus were given a placebo, thus known
sufferers went without treatment for "the benefits of science" or for
"the benefit of society."
Although the study has been called off, the question remains:
what are the research subjects left to do? If a child whose mother
received a placebo during the research experiment now tests positive
for HIV, can the child's mother bring a claim on behalf of the child
against the physician-investigators? This Article explores whether a
research subject has a remedy in a U.S. court for an injury suffered as
a result of participation in the research. The larger question behind
this case is whether researchers can be held accountable for injuries to
Pediatric AIDS in Thailand, (last modified Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.hsph.harvard.edui
hai/conferences/ thailand reports/thailand- 1994-3.html>.
3 See Laura E. Riley and Michael F. Greene, Elective Cesarean Delivery to
Reduce the Transmission of H1V, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1032 (1999).
4 The ACTG-076 regimen takes its name from the AIDS Clinical Trial Group
Protocol 076, which was the drug trial in which it was first discovered that this treatment
plan could dramatically reduce perinatal transmission of HIV. See Edward M. Connor et
al., Reduction of Maternal-Infant Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1
with Zidovudine Treatment, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1173 (1994) (for more information on
ACTG-076).
5 See, e.g., Ethics: CDC Explains Its Stand on Controversial Third World
AZT Study, AIDS WEEKLY PLUS, available in 1997 WL 11006847 (July 28, 1997). The
short-course is estimated to cost $50 - 80, whereas the full treatment, ACTG-076, is
estimated at over $800, a cost that far exceeds what most developing countries can afford.
CLINICAL TRIALS
research subjects under international human rights law.
A research subject injured as a result of a medical experiment
may have a cause of action against any one of several actors: the
physician-investigator; the institution sponsoring the research or
whose institutional review board (IRB) approved the research; the
pharmaceutical company funding or conducting the research; or the
participating physicians or researchers in the country in which the
research occurred. This Article focuses on causes of action against
the physicians-investigators in a U.S. court.
To date, the debate over the placebo drug trials in developing
countries has divided scholars and practitioners into two schools.
Proponents of the research say that the research was necessary and
was responsive to the existing economic and health conditions in
developing countries. 6 Critics maintain that the use of placebos was
unethical when a known effective treatment was available.7 This
Article does not intend to tackle the ethical debate, instead, the focus
here is on the legal question: can a woman with an HIV-positive child
bring a suit against the researchers in a U.S. court on behalf of the
child?
In considering this question, several issues must be addressed.
The first is whether a U.S. court would have jurisdiction over such a
claim. In other words, what U.S. law or international law confers
authority upon the courts to consider this claim? The other key issues
include the claim to be brought, and the question of causation.
In addressing this issue, the use of a hypothetical is helpful.
For this Article, I assume that a Thai woman while pregnant
participated in the AZT short course drug trial. She has discovered
that she received a placebo during the drug trial, and her child has
tested HIV-positive. Her question is whether she can bring a lawsuit
on behalf of her child against the physician-investigators that
conducted the experiment.
6 See Harold Varmer and David Satcher, Ethical Complexities of Conducting
Research in Developing Countries, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1003 (1997).
7 See Peter Lurie and Sidney M. Wolfe, Unethical Trials of Interventions to
Reduce Perinatal Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Developing
Countries, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 853-56 (1997); see also Marcia Angell, The Ethics of
Clinical Research in the Third World, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 847-49 (1997).
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I. U.S. COURT JURISDICTION
In a lawsuit against the researchers in the AZT drug trials, the
first significant hurdle that the prospective plaintiff must overcome is
the challenge of establishing subject matter jurisdiction for a. U.S.
court to handle this case. Human rights law provides one avenue for
obtaining jurisdiction, under the Alien Tort Claims Act.8
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) establishes U.S. district
court jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." 9  Rarely cited from 1789 to- 1980, this statute -was 're-
discovered" in a civil suit by the father and sister of a torture victim
seeking damages from the perpetrator of human rights abuses.
10
Relying on this statute, the court, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, held that
"deliberate torture perpetrated under color of authority violates
universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights,
regardless of the nationality of the parties."" With this ruling, the
court opened the door to future claims by non-citizens whose rights
had been violated. Since Filartiga, non-citizen plaintiffs have
invoked the ATCA in 'dozens of cases, in an attempt to obtain a
remedy for violations of their human rights. 12
Three elements are required under the ATCA: (1) an alien
plaintiff, (2) a tort; and (3) that the tort was committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. In a case in which a
physician-investigator causes injury to a subject, an action under the
ATCA may be the best hope for the injured subject. The first element
is automatically satisfied in the hypothetical case. Parts (2) and (3),
however, require further exploration, with the latter being the more
significant hurdle for the plaintiff. Thus, this Article begins with an
examination of the third element of this statute.
8 The Alien Torts Claims Act, (originally the Judiciary Act of 1789), ch. 20, §
9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350) (1994) [hereinafter ATCA].
9 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
10 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
1Id.
12 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (1 1th Cir. 1996); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hilao, et al., v. Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
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A. The "Law of Nations"
The starting point is to examine whether the researcher's
actions in conducting the AZT clinical trials violate the "law of
nations." .tA preliminary question then is what do we - or the courts
- mean by the law of nations. Professor Harold Koh explains that
the court in Filartiga held that "a tort in violation of the law of nations
means a violation of evolving international law, not static
international law, i.e., the law of nations as it exists today. When such
a violation exists and constitutes a tort, there is both subject-matter
jurisdiction and a cause of action in a Federal Court over suits brought
by aliens."' 3 Thus, we look to international law in its present day
form, to see whether the AZT drug trials violated the "law of nations."
International law generally consists of positive law. As a
result, customary law, or the law of nations, has developed slowly,
particularly in the area of human rights. Section 702 of the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
lists seven categories of customary human rights law violations:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state
policy, it practices, encourages, or condones
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights.
1 4
13 See Judicial Conference Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 170
F.R.D. 201, 289-90 (1996) (held June 13-16, 1996) (speech of Professor Harold Hongju
Koh, entitled Congressional Protection of International Human Rights and the United
States Courts, given at the General Session, June 15, 1996).
14 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, § 702 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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Although none of these sections explicitly mentions medical
experimentation, the issue of whether there is customary law on
medical experimentation cannot be dismissed so easily. First, the
prohibition on "torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment" may implicate medical experimentation.
Second, Section (g) may potentially include medical experimentation.
Finally, the above list "is not necessarily complete, and is not closed:
human rights not listed in [Section 702] may have achieved the status
of customary law."' 15 In other words, there may be sufficient
international agreement on medical experimentation to demonstrate
the existence of customary law in this area.
1. International Standards on Medical Research
The Nuremberg Code was the first effort by the international
community to establish guidelines for research with human subjects.
The Nuremberg Code was actually part of the judgment of the
Doctors Trial at Nuremberg, which was presided over by U.S. federal
judges. 16 It reads, in part:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is
absolutely essential.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid
all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and
injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is a
priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury
will occur except, perhaps, in those experiments where
the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in
charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment
at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the
15 Id. at § 702, cmt. a.
16 See GEORGE J. ANNAS & MICHAEL A. GRODIN, THE NAZI DOCTORS AND
THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 3-4 (1992)
[hereinafter ANNAS & GRODIN].
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exercise of good faith, superior skill, and careful
judgment required of him, that a continuation of the
experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or
death to the experimental subject.' 7
The Nuremberg Code sets forth two key concepts. First is that
the informed consent of the research subject is a requirement. Second,
and equally important, is that the "Nuremberg Code does not justify
research simply because patients give informed consent; it calls upon
researchers to eschew certain research as too risky in and of itself or in
relation to the potential benefit even if patients would give their
voluntary informed consent to participating., 18  Thus, physician-
investigators not only have the responsibility of ensuring the informed
consent of the participants, they also have the obligation to
independently assess the project and determine whether it presents too
great a risk to the research subjects. The latter can be characterized as
a duty that the researcher owes to the research subject.
Following the Nuremberg Code, two landmark developments
in the law of medical experimentation came within two years of each
other, from two very different sources. First, in 1964, the World
Medical Association (WMA) promulgated the Declaration of
Helsinki, Recommendations Guiding Doctors in Clinical Research.19
It represented an attempt by the medical community to establish its
own set of rules for conducting research. The Declaration of Helsinki,
which has been amended on three occasions, most recently in 1989,20
is discussed in further detail below.
The second major development in this area from the mid-
1960s is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), adopted by the U. N. General Assembly in 1966.21 Article 7
'
71d. at2.
18 See BARUCH A. BRODY, ETHICAL ISSUES IN DRUG TESTING, APPROVAL, AND
PRICING: THE CLOT-DISSOLVING DRUGS 100 (1995).
19 See Declaration I, June 1964, Helsinki, 18th World Medical Assembly,
noted in ANNAS & GRODIN, supra note 16, at 331-33.
20 See Declaration II, October 1975, Tokyo, 29th World Medical Assembly;
Declaration III, October 1983, Venice, 35th World Medical Assembly; Declaration IV,
September 1989, Hong Kong, 41st World Medical Assembly [hereinafter Declaration of
Helsinki IV], noted in ANNAS & GRODIN, supra note 16, at 333-42.
21 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
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of the ICCPR states that "No one shall be subject to torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one
shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation. 22  The status, and importance, of Article 7 is
affirmed in Article 4 of the ICCPR, which states, in part,.that a State
Party cannot derogate from its obligations under Aiticle 7 for any
reason.
23
Article 7, as its legislative history reveals, reflects the shock
and dismay over the horrors of the medical experimentation by Nazi
doctors during the Second World War, and takes the important step of
incorporating the First Principle 24 of the Nuremberg Code into a
legally binding instrument. Article 7 also reinforces the importance of
the concept of informed consent. Medical experimentation without
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR].221d. at art 7.
23 Id. at art. 4(2). Although Article 4 provides for limited circumstances in
which States Parties are allowed to take measures which derogate from their obligations
under the ICCPR (during times of "public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation" and only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under
international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour,
sex, language, religion, or social origin"), some articles of the ICCPR, including Article 7,
are non-derogable. See id. at art. 4.
24 The First Principle of the Nuremberg Code states:
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential. This means that the person involved should have legal
capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to
exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other
ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have
sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the
subject matter involved as to enable him to make an
understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element
requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by
the experimental subject there should be made known to him the
nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and
means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and
hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his
health or person which may possibly come from his participation
in the experiment.
First Principle of Nuremberg Code, reprinted in ANNAS & GRODIN, supra
note 16, at 2.
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informed consent is a violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR and
therefore a violation of international law.2 5
A closer look at the legislative history of Article 7 of the
ICCPR reveals that the sentence on medical experimentation was a
concerted response to the Nazi experimentation on human subjects.26
Early in the drafting process, government representatives discussed
whether this sentence should be included at all. Those in opposition
to the addition of the second sentence believed that it was not
necessary, since it aimed to prohibit that which was already covered
by the first sentence. 27  Most of the delegates, however, attached
special significance to the second sentence as a result of the atrocities
of the Nazi experimentation, and felt that .the second sentence
complemented the provisions of the first.2 8 What is notable about this
aspect of the development of Article 7 is that those who objected to
the second sentence opposed it not because they felt it was irrelevant
but because they believed it was already covered by the prohibition on
"torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
The drafters "finally agreed that the matter was so important as to
require a special provision, even, at. the risk of repetition." 29
In addition, considerable discussion took place on whether to
25 While Article 7 establishes that medical experimentation without informed
consent is a violation of international law, it seems unlikely that it intended to ban new
therapies for children or others who are unable by law to give their informed consent.
This leaves a gray area as to what is permissible. Article 7 has its roots in Nuremberg,
which did not involve clinical research, and thus did not cover situations where the
individual cannot consent to participate in clinical research. Still, this gray area does not
detract from the widely accepted principle that medical experimentation should not take
place without the subjects' informed consent or an appropriate substitute (e.g., the consent
of a parent or legal guardian, in the case of a child).
26 See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
CCPR COMMENTARY 137-38 (1993).
27 See MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 155 (1987).
28 See Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 13th
Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 32, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/4045 (1958). See BossuYT, supra note
27, at 155.
29 See Annotations on the text of the draft International Covenants on Human
Rights, U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 28 (Part II) at 31, U.N. Doc.
A/2929 (1955).
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include a list of permissible exceptions.30  During this discussion,
"proposals that sanctioned compulsory measures 'in the interest of
community health' were received with scepticism.",31 The idea of a
list of exceptions was eventually dropped, but the discussion further
revealed the drafters' intent to put individual rights of research
subjects at the forefront, ahead of broader interests of the community
or society.
The travaux pr~paratoires provide additional guidance,
suggesting that "where interference with the embryo gives rise to
permanent detrimental effects for life after birth, Article 7 certainly is
applicable." 32 One can argue that there is a difference between drug
trials in which "interference with the embryo gives rise to permanent
detrimental effects for life after birth" and the AZT drug trials (where
the drug did not interfere with the embryo in a manner which caused
defects, rather the lack of the drug - the placebo - resulted in the
transmission of a disease which possibly could have been prevented).
However, this distinction would not honor the drafters' intent, which
suggests that any experimentation in which an embryo is at risk has
implications under Article 7 and should be subject to a higher level of
scrutiny, and as such the AZT clinical trials should be subject to that
higher scrutiny.
Several other international declarations contribute to a
consensus on certain principles of medical research. The World
Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki outlines several
important principles. Basic Principle 9 requires the physician-
investigator to "obtain the subject's freely-given informed consent,"33
reflecting the continuing emphasis placed by the international medical
community on obtaining informed consent. Basic Principle 3 of the
Declaration. reads, in part, "The responsibility for the human subject
must always rest with a medically qualified person and never rest on
the subject of the research, even though the subject has given his
consent." 34 This reinforces the idea that the researcher has a duty to
30 See NOWAK, supra note 26, at 138. See also BOSSUYT, supra note 27, at
151-158.
31 See NOWAK, supra note 26, at 138.
321d. at 140-41.
33 See Declaration of Helsinki IV, supra note 20, at 341 (Basic Principle 9).
34 See id. at 341-42 (Basic Principle 3).
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the research subject.
The Declaration of Helsinki's Principle 3 for Medical
Research Combined with Professional Care states, "In any medical
study, every patient - including those of a control group, if any -
should be assured of the best proven diagnostic and therapeutic
method., 35 In addition, Principle 2 for clinical research states that,
"The potential benefits, hazards and discomfort of a new method
should be weighed against the advantages of the best current
diagnostic and therapeutic methods. 36 The Declaration further states
that "In the purely scientific application of medical research carried
out on a human being, it is the duty of the physician to remain the
protector of the life and health of that person on whom the biomedical
research is being carried out.",37  Finally, the Declaration asserts
"Concern for the interests of the subject must always prevail over the
interests of science and society." 38 All of these principles highlight
the primacy of the research subject's interests and the duties of the
physician investigator.
In the hypothetical case in the AZT clinical trials, a claim that
the physician-investigators breached their affirmative duty to the
participants in the study by putting the interests of "science and
society" before those of the research subjects who received a placebo
or by not ensuring "every patient - including those of a control
group, if any - of the best proven diagnostic and therapeutic method"
would raise the issue as to the meaning of the phrase the best proven
diagnostic and therapeutic method.39 Does it mean "the standard that
prevails in the country in which the clinical trial is carried out,' 40 or
35 See id. at 342 (Principle 3, Medical Research Combined with Professional
Care).
36 See id, at 342 (Principle 2, Medical Research Combined with Professional
Care).
37 See id., at 342 (Principle 1, Non-Therapeutic Biomedical Research
Involving Human Subjects).
38 See id., at 341 (Principle 5). See also id. at 341 (Principle 4, Non-
Therapeutic Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects.) "In research on man, the
interest of science and society should never take precedence over considerations related to
the well-being of the subject." Id. at 342.
39 For application of the best proven diagnostic method to the AZT clinical
trials, see infra text accompanying notes 87-88.
40 See Robert J. Levine, The "Best Proven Therapeutic Method" Standard in
20001 747
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simply the best proven method available anywhere?
The plain language of the principle says nothing about
qualifying "the best" method by location of the study. Further, it is
difficult to believe that the drafters of this principle intended to
provide such a large loophole as the location of a study. If this was
the intent, then,.one would be able to argue that "the best proven
method" need not be made available to participants of clinical trials in
places such as poor rural areas in Appalachia or in inner cities,
because individuals in those communities otherwise would not have
access to that treatment method. This cannot be the case. A
physician-investigator's fiduciary duty to the research subject must
relate to what the researcher has access to and not what resources the
participant has (or lacks). To make the duty depend on the position of
the research subject would be to allow for the physician's duty to vary
according to the wealth and resources of the research subject, an idea
that clearly would contradict the purpose of the Declaration of
Helsinki.
The Council for International Organizations of Medical
Sciences (CIOMS) has also developed a set of guidelines, the
International Ethical Guidelines for Research Involving Human
Subjects. 41 The CIOMS Guidelines, which emphasize the importance
of informed consent and also establish principles for doing research in
"underdeveloped communities," 42 further contribute to evidence of
Clinical Trials in Technologically Developing Countries, 13 AIDS & PUB. POL'Y J. 30,
31 (Spring 1998).
41 See Zbigniew Bankowski & R.J. Levine, Ethics and Research on Human
Subjects: International Guidelines, Proceedings of the XXVIth CIOMS Conference,
Geneva 5-7 February 1992 (1993) [hereinafter CIOMS Guidelines].
42 Id. at Guidelines 1-9 (on the issue of informed consent.). See, in particular,
Guideline 8, "Research involving persons in underdeveloped communities," which reads:
Before undertaking research involving subjects in
underdeveloped. communities, whether in developed of
developing countries, the investigator must ensure that:
- persons in underdeveloped communities will not ordinarily be
involved in research that could be carried out reasonably well in
developed communities;
- the research is responsive to health needs and the priorities of
the community in which it is to be carried out;
- every effort will be made to secure the ethical imperative that
the consent of the individual subjects be informed; and
748 [Vol. XVI
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international agreement on guiding principles for medical' research
involving human subjects. In addition, CIOMS Guideline 11 -
Selection of pregnant or nursing (breastfeeding) women as research
subjects - states, in part, that "Pregnant or nursing women should in
no circumstances be the subjects of non-clinical research unless the
research carries no more than minimal risk to the fetus. '43  The
Commentary on Guideline 11 states that the "justification for
[pregnant mothers'] participation in such clinical trials [as HIV drug
trials] would be that they should not be deprived arbitrarily of the
opportunity to benefit from investigational drugs, vaccines or other
agents that promise therapeutic or preventive benefit.."" Yet, one can
argue that the use of a placebo in the AZT clinical trials deprived the
pregnant mothers and their children of precisely that benefit.
Together, Article 7 of the ICCPR, the Nuremberg Code, the
Declaration of Helsinki and the CIOMS Guidelines provide
significant evidence of international agreement on medical
experimentation. Arguably, the fact that there is such international
agreement is evidence that there is "law" on medical experimentation,
and that this law is part of the law of nations.
That the Nuremberg Code, the World Medical Association's
Declaration of Helsinki, and the CIOMS Guidelines are not legally
binding treaties does not eliminate their significance. The Reporter's
Notes to Section 103 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States say that declarations of
international organizations can "provide important evidence of law."45
The Restatement (Third) adds that "The evidentiary value of such a
resolution is high if it is adopted by consensus or by virtually
unanimous vote of an organization of universal membership such as
the United Nations or its Specialized Agencies. 46
- the proposals for the research have been reviewed and approved
by an ethical review committee that has among its members or
consultants persons who are thoroughly familiar with the
customs and traditions of the community.
Id. Guideline 8, at 25.
43 Id. Guideline 11, at 33.
44Id. at 33.
45 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 103 (Reporter's Notes).
46 id.
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Further, in light of the worldwide condemnation of the Nazi
medical experiments, it would appear that the Nuremberg Code has
been accepted as "law" by the international community, or is evidence
of the law of nations. In fact, over twenty years ago, George Annas,
et al, wrote "This Code is part of international common law and may
be applied in both civil and criminal cases, by state, federal and
municipal courts in the United States.' 47 Since then, both the CIOMS
Guidelines and amended versions of the Declaration of Helsinki have
been promulgated, building upon the principles of the Nuremberg
Code. This further strengthens the claim that the Nuremberg Code is
part of the law of nations today.
The Nuremberg Code's role in the field of medical
experimentation parallels that of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in the field of human rights generally. The Universal
Declaration was initially only declaratory and non-binding, but
arguably many of its principles have become customary law "through
wide acceptance and recitation by nations as having normative
effect. 4 8 Similarly, the Nuremberg Code has been relied upon on
countless occasions as an expression of the principle of the
importance of informed consent. It has been deemed "[t]he most
complete and authoritative statement on the law of informed consent
to human experimentation. 49
Additional evidence of the normative effect of the Nuremberg
Code is the recognition by a U.S. federal court that "the Nuremberg
Code is part of the law of humanity. It may be applied in both civil
and criminal cases by federal courts in the United States.,, 50 A second
4 GEORGE J. ANNAS, ET AL, INFORMED CONSENT To HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT'S DILEMMA 21 (1997) [hereinafter ANNAS, ET AL.].
48 RICHARD BILDER, THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
AN OVERVIEW 8 (1978). See also, e.g., Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795
(D.Kan. 1980) (in which the court held that detention violated international law as
exemplified by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention
of Human Rights - neither of which had been ratified by the United States, but both of
which were evidence of the "law of nations."); Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103
F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1996) (in which the court relied on the UDHR and other
international conventions and declarations as evidence of the "content of international
law").
49 ANNAS, ET AL., supra note 47, at 1.
50 See In re Cincinnati Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796, 821 (S. D. Ohio 1995).
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District Court held that "non-consensual medical experimentation
violates the law of nations and, therefore, the laws of the United
States."'"
This apparent universal acceptance of the basic principles of
the Nuremberg Code begs the question whether the principles of the
Nuremberg Code rise to the level of a peremptory norm (or jus
cogens). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a
peremptory norm as "a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a noim from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character., 52 Given the universal condemnation .of the Nazi medical
experimentation in response to which the Nuremberg Code was
developed, and the subsequent agreements by the international
community supporting the principles of the Code (including Article 7
of the ICCPR which is non-derogable), it is arguable that the
Nuremberg Code has attained the status ofjus cogens. Further, the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
says that peremptory norms of international human rights law include
a prohibition on "torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment," 53 and this prohibition may also implicate
Note that only one Supreme Court case has discussed the Nuremberg Code, U.S. v.
Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987). In a narrow ruling, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for a
Court split 5 to 4, holding that allowing Stanley to sue for injuries suffered in LSD
experimentation without his consent by the military would be a judicial intrusion into
military affairs and "would call into question military discipline and decision-making."
483 U.S. 669, 682. However, the dissenting justices, in opinions by O'Connor, J. and
Brennan, J., relied on the Nuremberg Code. Justice O'Connor wrote, in part, that "No
judicially crafted rule should insulate from liability the involuntary and unknowing
human experimentation alleged to have occurred in this case." 483 U.S. 669, 709-10.
51 See White v. Paulson, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (holding
that the plaintiffs, former prisoners alleging that the prison physician subjected them to
non-consensual medical experimentation, did not have a right of action for violations of
international law because of the existence of adequate domestic remedies). In the
hypothetical case of a Thai woman bringing an action on behalf of her HIV+ child,
domestic remedies would not be available. In addition, the ATCA itself provides a
private right of action.
52 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, entered
into force January 27, 1980.
53 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 702, cmt. n.
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non-consensual medical experimentation. However, even if the
Code's principles do not rise to the level of peremptory norms, there
would seem to be sufficient evidence to deem them customary law -
or the "law of nations."
While the other declarations may not have such definitive
support, arguments can be made that the Declaration of Helsinki and
the CIOMS Guidelines are at the very least persuasive evidence of the
law. The principles outlined in these declarations build upon the
Nuremberg Cqde and ICCPR Article 7, giving further weight to the
principle of informed consent and to the principle that researchers
have an affirmative duty to their research subjects. One scholar
writes, "From the point of view of the development of the
international law of human rights in general terms, the formal
repetition of rights and standards in this way plays an important role
in their adoption and recognition as a part of customary law." 54
Significant evidence exists to suggest that the basic principles of
medical experimentation with human subjects discussed above are
part of the law of nations.
2. "Cruel" or "Inhuman" Treatment
Another avenue for a claim under the ATCA is to allege that
the actions of the researchers rise to the level of "cruel" or "inhuman"
treatment. "The law of nations" language of the statute points in the
direction of customary international law, which includes a prohibition
on "cruel" or "inhuman" treatment. 55 In addition, the United States is
a party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention on Torture).56
5 DAVID FREESTONE, CHILDREN AND THE LAW 291 (1990).
" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 702, and accompanying text. See also
Hilao,103 F.3d at 795 (referring to torture and cruel and inhuman treatment as "prohibited
not only be a specific, universal, and obligatory norm but by one that reaches the level of
jus cogens").
56 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Supp.
No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987 [hereinafter
Convention on Torture]. In addition, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also
prohibits cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. See Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), at art. 5 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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Article 16 of the Convention on Torture says that States Parties must
prevent "inhuman" treatment "when such acts are committed by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity."5 7 While the
United States has a reservation limiting its interpretation of "cruel"
and "inhuman" treatment to that proscribed by the U.S. Constitution,
58
the Alien Tort Claims Act only requires a violation of the law of
nations.
The Nuremberg Code and other declarations provide
substantive evidence of the law of nations, which- could make a
researcher liable for injuries suffered to subjects in certain clinical
trials. Then the Convention on Torture adds further -support as,
follows: If a local IRB, national research committee, or the ministry of
public health in the host country has approved the research, then the
researchers in effect become persons acting under color of law. This
could be enough to maintain a claim against researchers from the host
country, though it would not assist in a case against U.S. researchers
conducting research overseas. (One might argue that When research is
federally funded, the IRB approval dictated by U.S. law implies that
the research has been sanctioned by the U.S. Government or at least a
"person acting in an official capacity.") To the extent that the
Convention on Torture is evidence of the law of nations, the
defendants could be held liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
Furthermore, courts have held that certain practices used in
interrogation centers - including the deprivation of medical
treatment - are inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of
57 Convention on Torture, supra note 56, at art. 16.
58 U.S. Reservations, Declarations and Understandings, Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 Cong.
Rec. S17486-92 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990). The reservation says:
That the United States considers itself bound by the. obligation
under Article 16 to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment," only insofar as the term "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" means the cruel,
unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the
Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States.
Id. at S 17486.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).59  Though
ECHR decisions do not directly affect U.S. courts, they are evidence
of international law. 60  One must then ask whether deprivation of
medical treatment - e.g., giving a placebo to an HIV-positive
pregnant woman when effective treatment is available - in a clinical
trial setting is so radically different from the interrogation center
scenario. Some might object, saying that the scientific experiments
were necessary and served a greater purpose for society. Certainly,
one can take the view that a clinical trial provides greater benefit to
society than an interrogation. Yet all of the declarations on medical
experimentation state that the interests of the research subjects cannot
be discarded in favor of the interests of society. 6' Given the very low
survival rate of HIV-positive newborns, particularly in the developing
world, an argument could be made that the use of a placebo in this
instance exposed the subject to such great harm (for the child, most
likely a very early death) that the study violated the principle that the
interests of the research subject must come before that of science or
society.
3. "A Consistent Pattern of Gross Violations of Internationally
Recognized Human Rights"
A third argument is whether certain medical experimentation
could amount to "a consistent pattern of gross violations of
59 See NOWAK, supra note 26, at 131.
61 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 103(2), which reads:
In determining whether a rule has become international law,
substantial weight is accorded to
(a) judgments and opinions of international judicial and arbitral
tribunals
(b) judgments and opinions of national judicial tribunals
(c) the writings of scholars;
(d) pronouncements by states that undertake to state a rule of
international law, when such pronouncements are not seriously
challenged by other states.
Id.
61 See, e.g., Declaration of Helsinki IV, supra note 20, at 341 (Principle 5)
"Concern for the interests of the subject must always prevail over the interests of science
and society."
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internationally recognized human rights" as described in Section (g)
of Restatement § 702. A consistent pattern of gross violations is said
to refer to "violations of those rights that are universally accepted and
that no government would admit to violating as state policy. ' 62 They
are infringements on rights that "are not violations of customary law
when committed singly or sparingly ... [but] become violations of
customary law if the state is guilty of a 'consistent pattern of gross
violations' as state policy." 63 It would be difficult to argue that a
medical experiment falls under this category, unless it is maintained
that the "consistent pattern" is derived from violations to each
individual participating in the study. One would also have to argue
that the clinical trials are part of a state policy to commit gross
violations of human rights, which would be very difficult to prove.
Overall, it appears that a claim under this section would not succeed
and would be much more difficult to assert than the prior two. None
of the three claims would be "easy" to make, but the a claim that a
drug trial violates established customary law on medical
experimentation, or even that it rises to the level of "cruel" and
"inhuman" treatment, both seem more promising from the perspective
of our hypothetical plaintiff.
B. A Treaty of The United States
The second option is to find a "treaty of the United States"
which is violated by the researcher's actions, as the ATCA requires a
tort in violation of either the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States. Foremost is the ICCPR and its Article 7, prohibiting medical
experimentation without informed consent, which the United States
has ratified. Two issues are central to this inquiry: Article 2 of the
ICCPR, which establishes States Parties' obligations under the
Covenant; and the implications of the U.S. reservation to Article 7
itself.
Article 2 of the ICCPR reads, in part, that "Each State Party to
the present Covenant undertakes to respect and ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
62 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, §702 (Reporter's Note 10).
63 Id. § 702, cmt. m.
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recognized in the present Covenant ,,64 Therefore, in the
hypothetical case, one must establish that the United States is
obligated to ensure the rights of the HIV-positive child of the Thai
woman who was a participant in the drug trial. In examining Article
2, Thomas Buergenthal writes that "Clearly, the phrase 'to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction' should be
read as a disjunctive conjunction, indicating that a state party must be
deemed to have assumed the obligation to respect and to ensure the
rights recognized in the Covenant 'to all individuals within its
territory' and 'to all individuals subject to its jurisdiction'. '
Otherwise, Buergenthal observes, Article 2 "would produce results
that were clearly not intended. ' 66 If the United States acts in regard to
an individual, then that individual is subject to its jurisdiction. Here,
the U.S. researchers, who are in effect state actors since they are
participating in a study run by government agencies (the CDC and the
National Institutes for Health), act in regard to the participants in the
clinical trial. This makes the participants in the AZT drug trial subject
to U.S. jurisdiction, and thus the general obligations under the ICCPR
would apply with respect to their rights.
The second inquiry relates to the U.S. reservations to the
ICCPR, which modify its commitment to the standards outlined in the
treaty. The U.S. reservation to Article 7 of the ICCPR reads as
follows:
That the United States considers itself bound by
Article 7 to the extent that 'cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the
Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the
64 See ICCPR, supra note 21, at art. 2.
65 Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and
Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 74 (Louis Henkin ed, 1981).
66 Id. at 74. Buergenthal provides several examples of unintended
consequences if the phrase is not read as a disjunctive conjunction. For example, "a
person who is temporarily outside his country no longer enjoys the right claimed in
Article 12(4) not to be 'deprived of the right to enter his own country,' although that
provision is plainly designed to protect only individuals who happen to be outside their
country." Id.
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Constitution of the United States.67
The Senate Committee report does not make any mention of
the second half of Article 7, related to medical experimentation,
thereby at least implicitly finding no objection to it. However, the
reservation does limit the scope of the provision as it applies to the
United States and makes any Article 7 issue' in effect a question of
domestic law. Yet since medical experimentation without informed
consent is a violation under Federal law,68 then it follows that a U.S.
researcher violates an internationally recognized human right by
conducting a drug trial without the informed consent of participants in
the trial. More importantly, the physician-investigator's actions
would be in violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR - "a treaty of the
United States."
As a result, this claim against the researchers must focus on
whether the consent obtained was truly informed. In a number of
research studies in developing countries, the population from which
the research subjects are drawn consists largely of low- or uneducated,
and sometimes illiterate, individuals. 69  Often, they are very poor,
making it difficult for them to refuse to participate in any research
study that provides even a modest stipend. The low levels of
education combined with cultural differences form a formidable
barrier to ensuring informed consent. A dengue vaccine trial
conducted in Thailand provides a good example. 70 Even though the
vaccine was developed in Thailand and Thai researchers conducted
the experiments, there was still concern about whether consent was
67 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 31 I.L.M. 645, 659 (1992).
68 Under U.S. law, if a research project receives federal funding, then it is
required to have the approval of an Institutional Review Board (IRB), and one of the
criteria for IRB approval is informed consent of the research subjects. See 45 C.F.R. §
46.111 (a)(4).
69 Using research subjects with low levels of education does not by itself
preclude the possibility of informed consent. However, when lower-educated or
uneducated individuals participate in drug trials - whether in developing countries or in
industrialized nations - the opportunities for exploitation increase, and it becomes more
difficult to ensure that consent is truly informed.
70 See Nath Bahmarapravati, Asian Perspectives: Vaccine Trials in Thailand,
in CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 41, at 177-180.
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"informed," since the volunteers came from a poor, rural site 700
kilometers from Bangkok.7' One Thai researcher described the issue
of informed consent as follows:
Though we applied carefully and most conscientiously
the concept of informed consent, and consent forms
were duly signed, we could not satisfy ourselves that
we had complied fully with the international
guidelines. We attribute this to the very low level of
general knowledge or understanding of scientific and
technical information on the part of the volunteers and
their communities.
72
When a group of researchers from the host country struggles
to obtain "informed" consent, one must wonder whether a team of
foreign researchers that has the additional burden of overcoming
cultural barriers is capable of obtaining truly informed consent from
the research subjects. This question of whether consent was actually
"informed" in the hypothetical case at hand would require a much
more detailed examination of the evidence at trial.
73
C. Under Color of Law?
When the Filartiga case first established that the ATCA could
be used in human rights claims, the court held that the tort had to be
committed under color of law.74 At first glance, this requirement
raises two potential obstacles: whether conducting drug trials can be
considered action under color of law; and if so, does the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act 75 extinguish any claim. However, in Kadic
v. Karadzic, a claim under the ATCA for human rights abuses by
Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, the Second Circuit held that
the plaintiff could sue for tortious acts committed in violation of
71Id. at 177.
72Id. at 178-179.
73 See infra Section II.A for further discussion of the issue of informed
consent in the AZT clinical trials in Thailand.
74 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876.
75 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891, codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1130, 1602-11 (1994).
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customary international law.76 Of particular significance is that the
court extended the scope of the ATCA to include tortious acts by non-
state actors, holding that the court "do[es] not agree that the law of
nations, as understood in the modem era, confines its reach to state
action." 77 The Second Circuit stated that "certain forms of conduct
violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under
the auspices of a state or only as private individuals."
78
Several cases since Kadic have followed the Second Circuit's
expanded view of the scope of the ATCA. 79 This ruling opens the
door to pursue claims against individuals who violate the human
rights of others, irrespective of whether they are state actors, and
removes the potential barrier created by the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. In the hypothetical case against the researchers, the
Kadic decision removes a potential obstacle to this lawsuit.
II. OTHER ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:
Two other considerations are worth brief exploration: the issue
of what the tort is, and the issue of causation.
A. The Tort
International law in this area establishes two principles:
informed consent of the research subject is required, and the
researcher has an affirmative duty to the research subject.
The first claim is that the researcher did not receive the
informed consent of the research subject. This itself is a violation of
law, as expressed above. Several facts raise questions as to whether
consent was truly "informed." Cultural differences, low levels of
education, a lack of understanding of the science of the disease, and
76 Kadic, 70 F.3d 232.
77 Id. at 239. See generally, Alan Frederick Enslen, Filartiga's Offspring:
The Second Circuit Significantly Expands the Scope of the Alien Tort Claims Act With Its
Decision in Kadic v. Karadzic, 48 ALA. L. REv. 695 (1997).
78 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.79 See, e.g., National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma v. Unocal,
Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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poverty all create difficulties in ensuring informed consent. In
addition, the fact that the research subjects are HIV-positive and
desperate for any help at all in fighting this deadly disease makes it
questionable whether their consent is freely given. These factors hold
true for subjects in both the United States and in developing countries.
George Annas writes that "subjects who believe they have 'nothing to
lose' and are desperate because of their terminal illness should also be
disqualified as potential research subjects because they are unable to
provide voluntary, competent, informed or understanding consent to
the experimental intervention with such a view." 80  One of the
difficulties with AIDS drug trials is that investigators see them as
research while individuals suffering from AIDS often see them as
therapy.8' In the AZT clinical trials, although the women were
asymptomatic, they still greatly feared passing this virus on to their
children. This may have led them to view the trials as therapy.
Further, in the AZT clinical trials in developing countries, where a
researcher presents the drug trial as the only available option for
treatment for the potential research subject, a research subject may
feel pressured into participating.
Referring to one of the AZT clinical trials, a physician from
the Thai Red Cross Society notes that:
some pregnant women who sought antenatal care early
in pregnancy were not offered complete information or
told about the full benefits of the AIDS Clinical Trials
Group Protocol 076 regimen, but, rather, were left
untreated until the 3 6th week of gestation, when they
were randomly assigned to the zidovudine or placebo
group.
82
Evidence such as this not only raises serious ethical questions, but it
also reveals that some individuals were put in a position where the
80 George J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal, and Self-
Deception in Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 297,
314 (1996).
81 GEORGE J. ANNAS, STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN BIOETHICS
133 (1993).
82 Praphan Phanuphak, Ethical Issues in Studies in Thailand of the Vertical
Transmission of HIV, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 834-35 (1998).
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drug trial was their only available option in combating perinatal
transmission of the virus. In such situations, it is more difficult to
ensure that consent is "informed" or "freely-given."
Further, the consent forms used in the AZT clinical trials in
Thailand raise additional concerns. One review of the consent forms
determined that "the Thai and English versions differed in their
description of the study design." 83 The Thai-language consent form
stated that:
half of the participants will receive zidovudine,
whereas the other half will receive a comparison drug
that does not contain zidovudine. This drug has no
effect on your health or your baby's health. Using the
drug that does not contain zidovudine will help
determine the advantages and disadvantages of
zidovudine. 8
4
In contrast, the English version stated that:
half of the women will be given zidovudine, and half
will be given an inactive substance called placebo.
Placebo is a sugar pill which has no effect on your
health or your baby's health. The reason why some
women will get the placebo is to allow the study
investigators to determine as clearly as possible if a
short oral dosage of zidovudine is effective and safe
compared to taking no drug.85
As Achrekar and Gupta point out, "Nowhere in the Thai
version do the words 'inactive substance,' 'placebo' or 'sugar pill'
(for which Thai words or concepts exist) appear, whereas all are
included in the English version." 86 Conveying to research subjects
83 Abinash Achrekar and Raj esh Gupta, Informed Consent for a Clinical Trial
in Thailand (Correspondence), 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1331-32 (1998).
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. In a reply to Achrekar and Gupta, Dr. Limpakarnjanart et al. maintain
that the Thai language version was clear and that the use of the Thai phrase "ya priab
tiab" was not misleading. Khanchit Limpakarnjanart et al., Informed Consent for a
Clinical Trial in Thailand (Correspondence), 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1331-32 (1998). Dr.
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that they will receive either zidovudine or a comparison drug is, at
best, not providing as clear an explanation of the trial as possible, and
at worst is misleading. Either way, it raises questions as to whether
the pregnant women who took part in the study were truly informed
when they consented to participate in the drug trial.
The second option for the plaintiff in such a lawsuit would be
to claim that the researcher breached an affirmative duty to the
research subject, by not minimizing the harm to the unborn child or by
withholding available treatment. The Thai mother and child would
assert that the physician-investigators breached a duty to them by not
ensuring them of the best proven diagnostic and therapeutic method.
87
The plaintiffs could claim that they were entitled to the ACTG-076
protocol - especially since the trials were funded by the United
States where the ACTG-076 regimen was the best method available
- or, at the very least, to something more than no treatment at all.
In defense of their research, the physician-investigators would
maintain that it was necessary to use a placebo since developing
countries could not afford the ACTG-076 regimen. Although it is
important to find solutions that work locally, this reasoning seems to
fall short in the AZT drug trials, primarily because most developing
nations cannot afford even the cost of the short-course. 88  In other
Limpakarnjanart, et al. note that while "ya" does mean drug, "it also connotes
'substance'." Id. The author notes that while it is true that "ya" can mean substance
when used in conjunction with other words (e.g. "ya-see-fun" or toothpaste), it is used
alone to mean drug and in conjunction with other words to mean a range of medicinal or
drug-related terms. Most importantly, it is not difficult to see how a research subject,
who is aware that she is reading consent forms related to a drug trial, would read "ya" to
mean drug and not a generic substance.
87 For a discussion of "the best proven diagnostic and therapeutic method"
see supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
88 The cost of the short-course, US$50, greatly exceeds per capita health care
expenditures for most developing countries. See, for example, the statistics for some of
the countries involved in the mother-to-child HIV prevention trials:
Country (year) Per Capita Health Care Expenditure (US$)
Cote d'Ivoire (1995) 22
Ethiopia (1990) 5
Kenya (1992) 13
Malawi (1990) 11
Tanzania (1994) 5
Uganda (1991) 10
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words, the short-course regimen had little practical value for
developing countries, since even if proven effective, it would still not
be a viable solution. Thus, arguably the physician-investigators not
only breached their affirmative duties to their research subjects in the
AZT clinical trials, but they also appear to have violated the principle
of ensuring that research carried out in underdeveloped communities
must be responsive to the needs of those communities.
89
B. Causation
In bringing this case, causation will provide another potential
obstacle. In the AZT short-course drug trials, the results from
Thailand demonstrated that nineteen percent (19%) of women who
received the placebo transmitted the HIV virus to their children,
whereas only nine percent (9%) of women on AZT transmitted the
virus.90 On the one hand, in defense of the researchers, one could say
that since the child whose mother received the placebo still had only a
nineteen-percent chance of getting the virus, the placebo was not the
proximate cause of the injury to the child. Yet, the numbers also
show that the researchers had an opportunity to reduce the risk of HIV
transmission by over fifty percent and made a conscious decision not
to take the necessary steps to reduce the risk of transmission.9' This
would seem to be sufficient causation, or at least sufficient to allege a
breach of the affirmative duty physician-investigators have to their
research subjects.
An alternative strategy would be to bring the suit as a class
action, thereby reducing the impact of a defense that says the woman
may have been in the nine percent that transmits the virus to her child
even with AZT treatment. A class action insures that some of the
WORLD BANK SECTOR STRATEGY, HEALTH, NUTRITION, AND POPULATION (1997).
89 See CIOMS Guideline 8, supra note 42.90 See CDC: Shorter AZT Course Cuts Mother/Child HIV Transmission, Dow
JONES NEWS SERVICE, Feb 18, 1998, available in WESTLAW, DJNSPLUS Database.91 Note that if one argues that the control group should have received the
ACTG-076 regimen, then the researchers had the opportunity to reduce the risk of
transmission by two-thirds. For details of the ACTG-076 study, see Edward M. Connor,
et al., Reduction of Maternal-Infant Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Type 1 With Zidovudine Treatment, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173-80 (1994).
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plaintiffs would have been in the group that did not transmit HIV to
their children because of the AZT regimen. The Alien Tort Claims
Act has been used previously in a class action suit for human rights
abuses.92 As a class action, the group of research subjects similarly
situated may have an easier time proving injury.
Another aspect of causation relates to the role of the
physician-investigator more generally. Some may argue that these
women would, not have had access to any other treatment, and
therefore the researcher did no additional harm to the women or their
children. Howeyer, as demonstrated in the above discussion of
internationally agreed upon research principles, the researchers have
an affirmative duty to their research subjects, which includes not
exposing them to more than minimal risk or placing the interests of
society ahead of the interests of individual research subjects.
Arguably, the researchers in the AZT drug trials breached both of
these duties to the subjects that received the placebo, as effective
alternatives were available.
On the other hand, if the issue is that the researchers did not
properly obtain informed consent, then the law is clear - both
nationally and internationally - that medical experimentation without
the informed consent of the participants violates' the law. Though one
still might argue that the subjects would have participated anyway and
thus there is no causation, it would be wrong to jump to this
conclusion.93 Evelyne Shuster writes,
The primary ethical justification for the conduct of
such trials has been informed consent. However, even
if HIV-positive pregnant women in developing
countries understood all the implications of consenting
to a research that uses a placebo-controlled group
(which ,is questionable), it is highly unlikely that they
92 See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910
F.Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995), aff'd. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir.
1996).
93 If we do accept the idea that subjects would have participated anyway, then
this points to the idea that since there was no alternative treatment available, the subjects
were in effect forced to accept the conditions of participation. This hardly sounds like
"freely-given" or "informed" consent.
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would knowingly consent to participate in research
that offered no benefit to their communities (because
the fruits of such research would not be made
available).94
Shuster's comments cast additional doubt as to whether these women
would have participated.
Others may contend, however, that the Thai woman would
have participated in order to have at least a fifty-percent chance of
reducing the risk to her child. First, prior to the trial, it was not clear
how effective a short-course would be. Thus, the true option that a
woman considering participation faced would have been no treatment
or a fifty-percent chance at a treatment that may or may not be
effective (with uncertainties about side effects). This appears to
present, at the very least, a less compelling case for participation.
Further, if one argues that these women would have taken the chance,
as it was their only option for treatment, then we are back to
questioning whether they could give their informed consent if they
were facing such difficult circumstances.95 Either way, causation may
not be necessary in this case, as experimentation without informed
consent is a violation in itself.
94 Evelyne Shuster, The Nuremberg Code: Hippocratic Ethics and Human
Rights, 351 LANCET 974 (1998). Although the justification for the "short-course" was to
find a more affordable treatment option for developing countries, it is debatable whether
the current short-course reaches that aim. The cost of the short-course for a single
pregnant mother still exceeds the per capita healthcare expenditure of a number of
countries. See supra note 40. See also Donald J. McNeil, AIDS Stalking Africa's
Struggling Economies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at Al, A20 (reporting that "[e]ven
relatively rich South Africa says it cannot afford to offer $80 courses of AZT routinely to
pregnant and nursing mothers to prevent transmission to their children"). See also,
Leonard H. Glantz, et al., Research in Developing Countries: Taking "'Benefit" Seriously,
28 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 38, 40 (Nov-Dec 1998) ("[I]f the underdeveloped country
could not afford to spend $50 any more than it could spend $800, then it could not
possibly derive information that would be of any benefit to its population. This is the
definition of exploitation").
95 See George J. Annas & Michael Grodin, Human Rights and Maternal-
Fetal HIV Transmission Prevention Trials in Africa, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 560, 562
(1998) ("Informed consent, by itself, can protect many subjects of research in developed
countries, but its protective power is much more compromised in impoverished
populations who are being offered what looks like medical care that is otherwise
unavailable to them").
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
III. REMEDIES
A significant issue for individuals in developing countries who
may bring claims against researchers is the availability of a remedy.
One of the shortcomings of the Alien Tort Claims Act has been
obtaining compensation from the defendant. If the defendant has
assets in the United States, such as Ferdinand Marcos' Estate, then
obtaining damages is easier. If U.S. physician-investigators were
sued, presumably it would be possible to collect damages. If the
verdict were to be against host country researchers or a host country
institution, however, then collecting damages may prove to be
difficult. Still, while monetary damages are an important element in a
civil suit, providing these victims with an opportunity to prove that the
defendants acted improperly and are responsible for the injuries they
have suffered should not be underestimated.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In a suit against the physician-investigators or the sponsoring
institution under the Alien Tort Claims Act, the biggest challenge for
the plaintiffs would be to establish that the actions of the researchers
violated the law of nations. U.S. courts have moved slowly in
acknowledging new areas of customary international human rights
law, and most ATCA cases have tended to gravitate around a small set
of human rights violations. The current conservative trend in the
federal courts makes it less likely that a judge will expand the reach of
the ATCA very significantly in the near future. However, if the
plaintiffs can establish that the principles of informed consent and a
researcher's duty to his or her research subjects are part of customary
international law, then they may be able to get their case to a jury for
consideration.
Whether or not a suit of this nature is ultimately successful
should not be the sole consideration, as the prospects of such a lawsuit
raise some larger -questions as to the role of placebo drug trials in
developing countries. One of the broader concerns is that studies that
raise such ethical - and legal - questions will have potentially
negative long-term consequences. Mistrust of modern medicine may
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grow in countries where such medical interventions are necessary.
Marshall Kapp writes that "the public may learn that health
professionals sometimes deceive patients while treating them. If
health professions gain a reputation for deception, the lay population's
confidence in individual practitioners could be shattered., 96 Patients
in developing countries may be more likely to resort to self-care,
which could result in harm.97 Although Kapp wrote about the use of
placebos in patient care and not in research, many of the potential
implications are similar for developing country settings, where
individuals, for educational or, cultural reasons, may not distinguish
between physician-investigators and physicians.98
On the other hand, there will be many researchers who
maintain that their efforts are made for the benefit of society, and that
"human rights" should not be used to frustrate such efforts. These
individuals likely will be concerned that lawsuits such as the one
described here may have a chilling effect on researchers efforts; that
physician investigators fearing a lawsuit will not pursue potentially
beneficial clinical trials. Given that the number of clinical trials that
raise such significant ethical, and even legal, issues is a very small
percentage of the number of trials that are conducted, it is unlikely
that an ATCA suit would have such a chilling effect.
Furthermore, the aim of a lawsuit like the one in the
hypothetical is not to end the use of placebos in clinical trials. Even a
finding that physician-investigators violated the rights of Thai
villagers who participated in the AZT drug trials would not mean that
placebo trials can no longer be conducted. Any decision in a case like
this would likely be narrowly tailored to the facts of the case in
question. In reality, there are many situations in which placebo trials
not only make sense scientifically but are also both ethical and legal.
Such determinations are very much case-specific: is there really
96 Marshall B. Kapp, Placebo Therapy and the Law: Prescribe With Care, 8
AM. J. L. & MED. 371, 378 (1983)
17 Id. at 377-78.
98 The author's own experiences with public health programs in Thailand
over a three-year period reveal that villagers rarely distinguished between the physician-
as-researcher and the physician-as-caretaker, instead referring to both simply as "doctor."
Also, among Thai villagers, community health workers (who are not physicians) are also
referred to as "doctor."
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
informed consent? Are there alternative drug trials that can avoid
harm to the research subjects? Has the researcher breached his duty to
the research subject?
Although the aim in this Article is certainly not to put an end
to all trials using placebos, it is troubling that research is undertaken
using placebos in poorer areas of the world, when the same research
would not have been allowed to go forward in the United States.
Hans Jonas' words provide a strong warning:
Let us not forget that progress is an optional goal, not
an unconditional commitment . . .. [A] slower
progress in the conquest of disease would not threaten
society, grievous as it is to those who have to deplore
that their particular disease be not yet conquered, but
that society would indeed be threatened by the erosion
of those moral values whose loss, possibly caused by
too ruthless a pursuit of scientific progress, would
make its most dazzling triumphs not worth having."99
Ideally, the medical research community will take it upon
itself to develop stronger and clearer guidelines, and more strictly
enforce these standards. However, history has demonstrated that at
times ethical standards are not enough - even when dealing with
well-intentioned researchers. In these instances, human rights law can
provide an alternative means of offering protection to the most
vulnerable of populations.
99 Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human
Subjects, 98 DEADALUS 219, 245 (1969).
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